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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the effects of open market operations on interest rates in a model in
which agents must pay a fixed cost to exchange assets and cash. Asset markets are endogenously
segmented in that some agents choose to pay the fixed cost and some do not. When the fixed cost
is zero, the model reduces to the standard one in which persistent money injections increase
interest rates, flatten the yield curve, and lead to a downward-sloping yield curve on average. In
contrast, if markets are sufficiently segmented, then persistent money injections decrease nominal
interest rates, steepen or even twist the yield curve, and lead to an upward-sloping yield curve on
average.
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pkehoe@res.mpls..usWe study the connection between money and interest rates in a model with endoge-
nously segmented markets. In the model, agents must pay a …xed cost to transfer money
between the asset market and the goods market. In equilibrium, in any period, some agents
choose to pay the …xed cost and thus, at the margin, freely trade bonds and money. Other
agents choose not to pay the …xed cost and, hence, do not make such trades. Thus the asset
market is segmented in the sense that when the government injects money through an open
market operation, only a fraction of the agents in the economy are on the other side of the
transaction. We use this model to study the response of interest rates to a money growth
shock and the implications of monetary policy for the average term structure of interest rates.
We focus on two features of money and interest rates that have been discussed ex-
tensively in the literature. First, at least since Friedman (1968), there has been a long-held
belief that open market operations have liquidity e¤ects: money injections lead initially to
a decline in short-term nominal interest rates. These liquidity e¤ects are thought to decay
over time, with short-term rates eventually returning to normal levels or even rising. Ac-
cordingly, money injections are thought to steepen the yield curve, lowering long-term rates
less than short-term rates or even raising long-term rates. Second is the widely documented
fact that the yield curve is upward-sloping on average. (See, for example, Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay 1997.)
Our model can produce both of these features while the standard model cannot. In
the standard model without segmented markets, persistent money injections increase interest
rates of all maturities, ‡atten the yield curve, and lead to a downward-sloping yield curve on
average. In contrast, in our model, if markets are su¢ciently segmented, there are liquidity
e¤ects: persistent money injections lower short-term nominal interest rates, steepen or eventwist the yield curve, and lead to an upward-sloping yield curve on average.
The basic idea that money injections have liquidity e¤ects because only a fraction of
agents participate in any given open market operation is familiar from Grossman and Weiss
(1983) and Rotemberg (1984). Their models are cash-in-advance models in which half the
agents can transfer money between the asset market and the goods market in even periods
and half can do so in odd periods. In these models, markets are segmented in the sense that
when the government injects money, only those agents currently in contact with the asset
market absorb the new money. In addition to these trading frictions, the Grossman-Weiss-
Rotemberg models exogenously limit asset trade to uncontingent bonds. Because of that
market incompleteness, in addition to the pure liquidity e¤ects from the trading frictions,
these models have complicated wealth e¤ects which e¤ectively limit these studies to one-time
unanticipated shocks in deterministic environments.
The subsequent literature, initiated by Lucas (1990), organizes agents in coalitions as
a simple device to abstract from wealth e¤ects. In a coalition, agents pool their resources and
choose consumption subject to a single budget constraint for the coalition as a whole, subject
to restrictions on the trading technology. Given the trading technology, then, markets are
complete. Thus, monetary injections have real e¤ects only because of the trading frictions
and not because of additional exogenous market incompleteness.
The models in this literature are distinguished by types of trading frictions. In Lucas
(1990), Fuerst (1992), Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1995), the trading friction is that the coalition must divide its cash each period into
one portion to be used to purchase goods and another portion to be traded for bonds in
the asset market or used by …rms in production, before the size of the current open market
2operation is announced. Unfortunately, in simple versions of these models, liquidity e¤ects
last only one period.1 An alternative type of friction, used by Alvarez and Atkeson (1997),
permits agents to be in contact with asset markets only at exogenous times. This model can
generate persistent liquidity e¤ects, but only when velocity is extremely low.
Here we use a di¤erent friction: our trading technology requires that agents must pay
a …xed cost to transfer money between the goods market and the asset market. In addition,
trade in the goods market is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Here, as in Lucas (1990),
given the trading technology, markets are complete. In each period, it is optimal for agents
to follow a type of cuto¤ rule. Agents with high real balances pay the …xed cost to transfer
cash to the asset market, while those with low real balances pay the …xed cost to obtain cash
from the asset market. Agents with medium real balances do not pay the …xed cost and
simply consume their current cash holdings. The assumption of complete markets makes the
model tractable, because this assumption implies that all agents follow the same cuto¤ rule.
We refer to the agents who pay the …xed costs as traders and we refer to those who do not
as nontraders.
The …xed cost is the key di¤erence between our model and a standard cash-in-advance
model. If the …xed cost is zero, then all agents are traders and it reduces to a standard
model. Then money injections have no e¤ect on real interest rates and thus a¤ect nominal
interest rates only through their e¤ect on expected in‡ation. Since persistent money growth
shocks raise expectations of in‡ation, these shocks raise nominal interest rates. If the …xed
1In a variant on their basic model, Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) and Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1995) show how introducing costs of portfolio adjustment can lead to longer lasting liquidity e¤ects.
Evans and Marshall (1997) use this model to analyze the response of interest rates of di¤erent maturities to
monetary shocks.
3cost is positive, however, when the government injects money by buying bonds, only the
fraction of agents who are traders are on the other side of the market. Money injections fall
disproportionately on these agents, who thus increase their current consumption, decrease
their current marginal utility, and, hence, decrease real interest rates. We refer to this
additional e¤ect of money injections on interest rates as the segmentation e¤ect. If this
segmentation e¤ect outweighs the standard expected in‡ation e¤ect, then a persistent increase
in money growth in the model has a persistent liquidity e¤ect on interest rates.
Our model’s implications for the average yield curve also di¤er from the standard
model. In the standard model, the …xed cost is zero and money growth shocks have only
standard expected in‡ation e¤ects which, by themselves, tend to make the average nominal
yield curve downward-sloping. In contrast, in our model, when the …xed cost is positive and
money shocks are mean-reverting, then the consumption of traders is mean-reverting because
of the segmentation e¤ect. Generally, if the consumption of agents in …nancial markets is
mean-reverting, then the yield curve for real interest rates is upward-sloping (Campbell 1986,
Backus, Gregory, and Zin 1989, 1998, and Labadie 1994). If thissegmentation e¤ect outweighs
the standard expected in‡ation e¤ect, then the nominal yield curve is upward-sloping.
Finally, our model is related to the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) models in which
agents pay a …xed cost each time they trade bonds and money. Jovanovic (1982), Romer
(1986), and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) develop general equilibrium versions of these mod-
els and use them to study how di¤erent constant in‡ation rates a¤ect the steady state. In
contrast to all of those studies, however, this one examines the dynamic response of interest
rates to money growth shocks.
41. The Economy
Consider a cash-in-advance economy with an in…nite number of periods t = 0;1;2;:::;
a government, and a continuum of agents of measure 1. Trade in this economy occurs in two
separate locations: an asset market and a goods market. In the asset market, agents trade
cash and bonds which promise delivery of cash in the asset market in the next period, and
the government introduces cash via open market operations. In the goods market, agents use
cash to buy goods subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, and agents sell their endowments
for cash. Agents face a real …xed cost of ° for each transfer of cash between the asset market
and the goods market:
This economy has two sources of uncertainty: idiosyncratic shocks to agents’ endow-
ments and shocks to money growth. Each period t ¸ 1, each agent in the economy has an
endowment y which is independent and identically distributed with distribution F which has
density f: Let Y =
R
yf(y)dy be the constant aggregate endowment. In period 1 agents
also have y0=¹1 real balances in the goods market where y0 also has distribution F and ¹1
is the money growth shock at the beginning of period 1: In period 0; agents have ¹ B units
of government debt, which is a claim on ¹ B dollars in the asset market in period 0. Let
yt = (y0;y1;y2;:::;yt) denote a typical history of individual shocks up through period t and
f(yt) = f(y0)f(y1):::f(yt) the probability density over such histories. Let Mt denote the
aggregate stock of money in period t; and let ¹t = Mt=Mt¡1 denote the growth rate of that
money supply. Let ¹t = (¹1;:::;¹t) denote the history of money growth shocks up through
period t; and let g(¹t) denote the probability density over such histories : Let g (¹tj¹t¡1)
denote the conditional density of ¹t given ¹t¡1:
The timing within each period t ¸ 1 is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
5money growth ¹t is realized, bonds and cash are exchanged in the asset market, and agents
pay cash in the asset market to a …rm that transfers cash between the asset and the goods
markets. Agents then use real balances in the goods market to purchase consumption before
learning the realization of their endowment, and then they sell their endowment yt for cash.
In period 0 there is no trade in goods and agents simply trade bonds.
The government issues one-period bonds contingent on the aggregate state ¹t. In
period t, given state ¹t; the government pays o¤ outstanding bonds B (¹t) in cash and issues
claims to cash in the next asset market of the form B(¹t;¹t+1) at prices q(¹t;¹t+1). The





















In period 0; this constraint is ¹ B =
R
¹1 q(¹1)B (¹1)d¹1:
In the asset market in each period and state, agents trade a set of one-period bonds
that have payo¤s next period which are contingent both on the aggregate event ¹t+1 and their





claims to cash that pay o¤ in the next period contingent
on the aggregate shock ¹t+1 and the agent’s endowment shock yt: We let q(¹t;¹t+1;yt) be the
price of such a bond that pays one dollar in the asset market in period t + 1 contingent on
the relevant events. Because individual endowments are i.i.d. across individuals, we assume
that these bond prices do not depend on the name of the individual.
Instead of letting each agent trade in all possible claims contingent on other agents
endowments, we suppose that each agent trades only in claims contingent on the agent’s own
endowment with some intermediary. This intermediary buys government bonds and trades in
6the agent-speci…c contingent claims. This latter approach is much less cumbersome than the
former and yields the same outcomes. Speci…cally, the intermediary buys government bonds





































Lack of arbitrage requires that the price functions q(¹t;yt¡1) and q(¹t) satisfy q(¹t;yt¡1) =
q(¹t)f(yt¡1). Notice that with these price functions the pro…ts of the intermediary are zero.
Consider now the problem of an individual agent. Let P(¹t) denote the price level in
the goods market in period t: In the goods market, in each period t ¸ 1; agents start with
real balances m(¹t;yt¡1). They then choose transfers of real balances between the goods
market and the asset market x(¹t;yt¡1); an indicator variable z(¹t;yt¡1) equal to zero if
these transfers are zero and one if they are not, consumption c(¹t;yt¡1); and unspent real
























and the cash-in-advance constraints
a(¹
t;y
t¡1) ¸ 0; (5)
7where in (3) at t = 1; the term m(¹t;yt¡1) is given by y0=¹1:
In the asset market, each period agents start with cash payments B(¹t;yt¡1) on their
bonds and N(¹t¡1;yt¡2) held over as cash from the previous asset market. They purchase
new bonds, make cash transfers to the goods market and hold N(¹t;yt¡1) over in cash to the


































with N(¹t;yt¡1) ¸ 0 and N(¹t¡1;yt¡2) = N0 in period t = 1: In period t = 0; thisasset market




y0 q(¹1)B (¹1;y0)f(y0)dy0d¹1+N0: Assume that both consumption and
real bond holdings B(¹t;yt¡1)=P(¹t) are uniformly bounded by some large constants. Notice
that N(¹t;yt¡1) is cash that agents hold over in the asset market while P(¹t)a(¹t;yt¡1) is
cash that agents hold over in the goods market.

















subject to the constraints (3) – (6).
The economy has a …rm that transfers cash between the asset market and the goods
market. Since each transfer of cash consumes ° units of goods, the total goods cost of carrying
out all transfers at t is °
R
z(¹t;yt¡1)f(yt¡1)dyt¡1:The …rmpurchases these goods in the goods
market with cash obtained from consumers in that period’s asset market.










t¡1 = Y (8)






















for all ¹t with N(¹t) =
R
yt¡1 N(¹t;yt¡1)f(yt¡1)dyt¡1: Let c denote the sequence of functions
c(¹t;yt¡1); and use similar notation for other variables.
Here, an equilibrium is a collection of bond and goods prices q and P; together with
bond holdings B and an allocation c;x;z;a;m such that the bond holdings and the allocation
solve the agent’s utility maximization problem, the intermediary maximizes pro…ts, the gov-
ernment budget constraint holds, and the resource constraint and the money market clearing
conditions are satis…ed.
2. Characterizing Equilibrium
Now we characterize equilibria in this economy in which agents never hold over cash
in either the goods market or the asset market, so that a and N are always zero. We do this
in several steps. We …rst characterize the optimal choice of c and x given prices and arbitrary
rules for m;a; and z, and we summarize these results in Proposition 1. We then characterize
the trading rule z; given an arbitrary rule for m; and a and the optimal rules for c and x;
and we summarize these results in Proposition 2. In Proposition 3, we solve for equilibrium
c;x;z; and money holdings m under the assumption that both a and N are always zero. In
Proposition 4, we characterize the equilibrium bond holdings. In Proposition 5, we provide
su¢cient conditions on the money growth process and the endowments process to ensure that
a and N are always zero.
9It simpli…es our analysis to use the sequence of budget constraints (6) to substitute
out for agent’s bond holdings and replace these constraints with a single period 0 constraint
on agents’ transfers of cash between the asset market and the goods market. To that end,
de…ne period 0 prices Q(¹t) for a unit of cash delivered in the asset market in period t in state
¹t as follows. Let Q(¹1) = q(¹1) and Q(¹t) = q(¹t¡1;¹t)Q(¹t¡1): Accordingly, any bounded






























Thus, the consumer’s problem can be restated as follows: choose real money holdings m and
a; trading rule z; consumption and transfers c and x and cash in the asset market N; subject
to constraints (3) – (5) and (10).
Consider …rst an agent’s optimal choice of consumption c(¹t;yt¡1) and transfers of
real balances x(¹t;yt¡1) given prices Q(¹t);P(¹t); arbitrary feasible choices of real money
holdings m(¹t;yt¡1) and a(¹t;yt¡1); and a trading rule z(¹t;yt¡1): These choices maximize
the Lagrangian corresponding to the consumer’s problem. Let º(¹t;yt¡1) be the multiplier






































10Since all agents are identical in period 0; the multipliers in the Lagrangian are the same for
all agents. In summary:
Proposition 1. All agents who choose to pay the …xed cost for a given aggregate state ¹t
have identical consumption c(¹t;yt¡1) = cT(¹t); for some function cT: Agents who choose not








Next consider an agent’s optimal choice of whether to pay the …xed cost to trade given
prices Q(¹t), P(¹t) and arbitrary feasible choices of real money holdings in the goods market
m(¹t;yt¡1); a(¹t;yt¡1): From Proposition 1, we have the form of the optimal consumption
and transfer rules corresponding to the choices of z = 1 and z = 0: Substituting these rules


















































































Let ´ denote the Lagrange multiplier on (14), and consider the following variational argument.


























which is simply the direct utility gain U (cT(¹t)) minus the cost of the required transfers.













which is simply the direct utility gain since there are no transfers. The …rst order condition












Subtracting (16) from (15) and using (17); we see that it is optimal to set z(¹t;yt¡1) = 1 if
h(m(¹t;yt¡1) ¡a(¹t;yt¡1);cT(¹t)) > 0; where
h(m ¡ a;cT) = U(cT) ¡ U
0(cT)[(cT + °) ¡ (m ¡a)] ¡U (m ¡a): (18)
Note that h is strictly convex in the argument m¡a; it attains its minimum at m¡a = cT;





;cT) = 0; (19)
when both of these solutions exist. If (19) is negative for all y=¹ < cT; then set yL (cT;¹) = 0;
if it is negative for all y=¹ > cT; then set yH (cT;¹) = 1: Thus, an agent’s decision to trade
follows a cuto¤ rule as illustrated in Figure 1. In summary:








; and they choose z(¹t;yt¡1) = 1 other-
wise.
12Next, we suppose that do not carry over cash either in the asset market or in the goods
market so that N and a are always zero. We …rst characterize the rest of the equilibrium
given these suppositions and then provide su¢cient conditions for these suppositions to hold.
If agents never carry over cash in either the asset market or the goods market, (4), (8),
and (9) imply that P(¹t) = M(¹t)=Y; money holdings are given by m(¹t;yt¡1) = yt¡1=¹t; and
consumption of nontraders is c(¹t;yt¡1) = yt¡1=¹t: Substituting the nontraders’ consumption
into the resource constraint (8) and using the cuto¤ rules de…ned in (19) gives





yf(y)dy = Y; (20)
where we have suppressed explicit dependence of cT;yH; and yL on ¹t: Clearly, these cuto¤
points and the consumption levels of traders depend only on ¹t; while the consumption level
of nontraders depends only on (¹t;yt¡1): The equilibrium values of the cuto¤ points and
consumption of traders solve equations (19) and (20). Fix ¹t and use (19) to solve for yL
and yH as functions of cT; then note that the left side of (20) is continuous and strictly
monotonic in cT and is less than Y for cT = 0 and greater than Y as cT becomes large. Thus,
these equations have a unique solution for the equilibrium values of traders’ consumption and
cuto¤s for any money growth rate ¹:
Note that if the …xed cost ° is zero, then from (19), yH = yL, all consumers are traders,
and their consumption c = Y is independent of the money injection. In contrast, if the …xed
cost is positive, then some consumers are nontraders and money injections have distributional
e¤ects. In summary:




> > > <
> > > :
yt¡1=¹t if yt¡1 2 (yL(¹t);yH (¹t))
cT (¹t) otherwise
where the functions yL(¹);yH (¹);cT (¹) are the solutions to (19) and (20).
The bond holdings in this equilibrium have a simple form. For each aggregate state
¹t; all agents purchase an identical portfolio of bonds. That is, B(¹t;¹t+1;yt¡1;yt) does not
depend on individual histories yt¡1: To see this, note that we can iterate on the sequence of
























Since the right side of (21) does not depend on yt¡1; neither does the left side. We know,
then, from (2) that each agent, regardless of individual history, buys an equal share of the
new government debt issued. Then, using (6) and (1), we have that in period t ¡ 1 in state
¹t¡1; agents buy the following bonds to pay o¤ at t in state ¹t :
Proposition 4. For all realizations of ¹t and yt¡1 such that the agent would be a nontrader
in period t; namely those that satisfy yt¡1 2 (yL(¹t);yH(¹t)); the agent buys bonds providing









14For all realizations of yt¡1 such that the agent would be a trader, the agent buys bonds providing
for the same constant payo¤ as a nontrader plus the contingent payo¤ required to pay for the













In period t the government will be issuing new money M(¹t) ¡ M(¹t¡1) to purchase
some of the outstanding government bonds B(¹t): In period t¡1; agents plan so that if they
are traders at t, they will have enough extra bonds to purchase both the amount of money
injection they need to carry out their desired transfer as well as the amount of the new
government debt issued. In the aggregate, these traders purchase the entire money injection
as well as the new government debt. At t ¡ 1, agents plan so that if they are nontraders
at t; they will only have enough bonds to purchase the new government debt issued. Thus,
agents plan their portfolios so that their endowment shocks do not a¤ect their overall wealth
positions. They use bonds to provide insurance against next period’s endowment shock.
We now develop conditions su¢cient to guarantee that our suppositions hold. The
condition for N to be zero, so that agents in the asset market prefer to save using nominal
bondsratherthan money, is
R
q(¹t;¹t+1)d¹t+1 < 1; which simply ensuresthat nominal interest
rates are positive for all periods t and states ¹t: In terms of marginal utilities, this condition









To develop the condition for a to be zero, we proceed as follows. Let Q(¹t) and
P(¹t) be the prices constructed above when a and N are always zero. Consider a class of
15potential deviations by a single agent when faced with these prices. In particular, consider
the problem of an agent from period t on, starting in state (¹t;yt¡1) with arbitrary bond
holdings ¹ B(¹t;yt¡1) and money holdings ¹ m(¹t;yt¡1); with budget constraints of the form
given in (6), taking these prices Q(¹t) and P(¹t) as given. Here, as before, we can turn the
sequence of budget constraints into a single budget constraint, except that now it starts in
period t instead of period 0:
The …rst-order conditions for the period t problem will be identical to those of the
period 0 problem, except for the multiplier on the single budget constraint; that will di¤er
because ¹ B(¹t;yt¡1) and ¹ m(¹t;yt¡1) are arbitrarily chosen and are not the equilibrium bond
and money holdings. The …rst-orderconditions forthe consumption of tradersfromthe period
0 problem are given in (17), while the …rst-order conditions for cT in periods s ¸ t from the
period t problem with arbitrary asset holdings are of the same form with some new multiplier
which depends on ¹ B(¹t;yt¡1) and ¹ m(¹t;yt¡1): Hence, the consumption of this agent when
the agent trades is given by a function cT(¹s;~ ´) that solves U0(cT(¹s;~ ´)) = ~ ´U0(cT(¹s)) for
some ~ ´ ¸ 0, which should be thought of as the ratio of the original to the new multiplier.
Given cT(¹s;~ ´), let yL(¹;~ ´) and yH(¹;~ ´) be the associated solutions to (19).
For this agent to choose a(¹t;yt¡1) = 0; when a is constrained to be zero in all future
periods, it is su¢cient that, for all ¹t;~ ´; and a;
U




















[F(yL(¹t+1;~ ´) ¡ a) + 1 ¡ F(yH(¹t+1;~ ´) ¡ a)]g(¹t+1j¹
t)d¹t+1:
Notice that (25) simply requires that the shadow nominal interest rate for each individual be
positive, regardless of the shock ¹; individual’s wealth as re‡ected in ~ ´; or the individual’s
16choice of a in the current period. Finally, we get
Proposition 5. It is optimal for an agent never to hold over cash in the asset market if
(24) holds for all values of ¹t: It is optimal for an agent to never hold over cash in the goods
market if (25) holds:
Proof. When (24) holds, nominal interest rates in the asset market are positive, so agents
hold over no cash in the asset market. To see that a is identically equal to zero, suppose to
the contrary that there is a plan with a > 0 for at least one state that gives higher utility.
Consider, …rst, a plan in which a > 0 in at most a …nite set of periods. Let t be the last such
period, and suppose that a(¹t;yt¡1) > 0: In that period, the highest consumption that an
agent with wealth level indexed by ~ ´ would choose is yH(¹t;~ ´) [since yH(¹t;~ ´) > cT(¹t;~ ´)]:
Hence, the lowest an agent’s shadow nominal interest rate could be is the level at which
current consumption is yH(¹t;~ ´). Since t is the last period in which a is positive, (25) implies
that lowering a to zero is optimal. Hence we have a contradiction. If no …nite deviations
raise utility, and, since consumption is bounded and ¯ < 1; no plan in which a > 0 for an
in…nite set of periods gives higher utility than the one with a identically equal to zero.
The following is a simpler condition su¢cient to ensure that (25) holds. Let
U









for all st and ~ ´: This condition clearly holds for small ° and ¯Et1=¹t+1 small.
3. Asset prices
Now we develop the links between money injections and asset prices. The link that
is introduced with market segmentation is how a trader’s consumption responds to a money
17injection. We start with this link and then develop formulas for asset prices.
Recall from (17) that date zero nominal asset prices are given by the traders’ marginal
utility of a dollar. Since P(¹t) = M(¹t)=Y; in order to characterize the response of asset
prices to money injections, we need to determine how a trader’s consumption responds to a
money injection, namely, how cT(¹t) varies with ¹t:
Consider a simple example in which y takes on three values y0 < y1 < y2; with
probabilities f0;f1;f2; respectively. We conjecture an equilibrium in which, when money
growth is ¹ ¹; agents with the central value of the endowment y1 choose not to trade and those
with low and high endowments y0 and y2 choose to trade. Under this conjecture, for money
growth shocks ¹ close to ¹ ¹; from the resource constraint, traders each consume an equal share












The corresponding cuto¤s yL (cT (¹);¹);yH (cT (¹);¹) are found from (19). This conjecture
is valid as long as y0 < yL (cT (¹ ¹); ¹ ¹) < y1 < yH (cT (¹ ¹); ¹ ¹) < y2: Su¢cient conditions for this
conjecture to hold are that traders’ consumption as de…ned in (26) satis…es cT (¹ ¹) = y1=¹ ¹;
and ° is su¢ciently small. Under these conditions, the consumption of traders when ¹ = ¹ ¹ is
y1=¹ ¹; while that of nontraders is also y1=¹ ¹: As ° gets small the cuto¤s yL (cT (¹ ¹); ¹ ¹)=¹ ¹ and
yH (cT (¹ ¹); ¹ ¹)=¹ ¹ approach cT so that the above inequalities hold.
Clearly, an increase in the money growth rate ¹ raises the in‡ation tax levied on
nontraders’ real balances. In equilibrium, asset prices adjust to redistribute these in‡ation
tax revenues to traders. In this example, the number of traders does not vary with the money







which is the ratio of the total consumption of nontraders to that of traders.
In general, a money injection increases the total amount consumed by traders and
changes the number of agents who choose to become traders. If that number of agents
does not increase much, the consumption of each trader increases. Of course, if the number
increases enough, then the consumption of each trader can actually fall. In Appendix A we
elaborate this point.
Next we develop formulas for equilibrium asset prices. To get analytical results, we
make the following assumptions. Let the log of money growth in period t; log ¹t; be normally
distributed and have constant conditional variance over time. Let ¹ ¹ be de…ned by log ¹ ¹ =
E log¹t; where E is the unconditional expectation. Let U(c) = c1¡¾=(1 ¡ ¾); where ¾ > 0:
Let ¹ cT denote the consumption of traders when money growth is equal to ¹ ¹: To a …rst-order
approximation, the log of traders’ marginal utility is given by
logU
0 (cTt) = logU
0 (¹ cT) ¡ Á(log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹); (28)




evaluated at ¹ = ¹ ¹: The parameter Á is the elasticity of a trader’s marginal utility with
respect to a money injection.
With these assumptions, we will analyze the relation between money and interest
rates. These interest rates are calculated from nominal and real bond prices. In what follows,
19we suppress reference to the state ¹t and write the price of an n-period bond that costs qn
t













Taking logs of (30) and using the result that for any lognormal variable x; logEx = E logx+
varlogx=2, we write the log of bond prices as
logq
n



















Since output is constant, in‡ation is given by logPt+n = logPt +
Pn
j=1¹t+j; and, using the
approximation (28), we write the log of bond prices as
logq
n









log¹t+j ¡ log ¹ ¹
´
; (32)









We use these bond prices to de…ne yields and forward rates. The yield on an n-period
nominal bond is rn
t = ¡1
n logqn
t : The forward interest rate between periods t+n and t+n+1




t ): Thus, the forward rate is the rate of return between periods
t+ n and t+ n + 1 that can be guaranteed in period t: Clearly, then the yield is the average








Now we present several examples to illustrate the impact of money injections on inter-
est rates under alternative assumptions about the stochastic process for money growth and
the degree of market segmentation:
20In the standard model, ° = 0; so Á = 0 and real interest rates are constant. From
(32), we know that nominal bond prices are given by
logq
n






log¹t+j ¡ log ¹ ¹
1







which is the deviation of cumulative expected in‡ation between period t and t + n from its
unconditional mean. We call this term the expected in‡ation e¤ect.
In our model with ° > 0; there is also a segmentation e¤ect. This e¤ect is the impact of




in (32). A money growth shock that increases ¹t also increases the consumption of traders at
t and drives down their marginal utility at t; this part of the e¤ect, by itself, raises all bond
prices by Á(log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹): If the money growth shock raises expected money growth at t+n
as well, then it raises future consumption and lowers future marginal utility for traders; this
part of the e¤ect, by itself, lowers all bond prices by ÁEt
³
log¹t+n ¡ log ¹ ¹
´
:
The overall magnitude of the segmentation e¤ect depends on two parameters: the elas-
ticity of the marginal utility of traders with respect to money growth Á and the persistence





mentation e¤ect increases the higher is Á; that is, the more responsive is a trader’s marginal
utility to a money injection. This e¤ect is smaller the greater is the persistence of money
growth. If money growth is temporary, then a given money injection will lead to a temporary
increase in traders’ consumption and, hence, a relatively large drop in the real interest rate,
driving down the nominal interest rate. As the shock to money growth becomes more per-
sistent, a given money injection leads to a more permanent increase in traders’ consumption
and, hence, to a smaller drop in the real interest rate.
21Example 1. (Autoregressive money growth). Assume that monetary injections satisfy
log¹t+1 = (1 ¡ ½)log ¹ ¹ + ½log¹t + "t+1;
where "t+1 is a normal, i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and variance ¾2
². The nominal bond
price in (32) then becomes
logq
n




[(1 ¡ ½)Á ¡ ½](log¹t ¡log ¹ ¹): (33)
Here the segmentation e¤ect is captured by the term (1 ¡ ½n)Á(log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹). The
sign of the segmentation e¤ect is positive, so with segmented markets, higher money growth





then the segmentation e¤ect dominates the expected in‡ation e¤ect, and a money injection
leads to a fall in nominal interest rates.
Consider now the impact e¤ects of the money shock on the forward rate curve and the
yield curve. From (33), fn
t ¡ ¹ fn = ½n [(½ ¡ 1)Á + ½](log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹) and
r
n






[(½ ¡ 1)Á+ ½](log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹): (35)
When (34) holds, so that the segmentation e¤ect dominates the expected in‡ation e¤ect, a
money injection lowers the shorter forward rates and yields by more than the longer forward
rates and yields and thus steepens both the forward rate curve and the yield curve.
Now considerthe dynamics of interest rates of di¤erent maturities. The n-period yields
expected in period t+ k following a money injection at t are given by
Etr
n




t ¡ ¹ r
n): (36)
22Thus, each yield returns to its mean value at rate ½: As long as the segmentation e¤ect
dominates the expected in‡ation e¤ect, we have the following: transient money growth shocks
cause sharp but temporary declines in nominal rates while persistent money growth shocks
cause smaller but more persistent declines in nominal rates. Note that if the segmentation
e¤ect dominates the expected in‡ation e¤ect in (35) and (36), then a money injection lowers
interest rates of all maturities n at all horizons t + k: In the standard model, the expected
in‡ation e¤ect dominates, and a money injection raises nominal rates of all maturities at all
horizons.
So far, we have worked out relations between money injections and interest rates for
a simple money growth process. Now we develop these relations when money growth has a
general moving-average representation:




where "t¡j are independent and N(0;¾2
"): The basic building block for pricing nominal assets
is the pricing kernel, namely, the state-contingent marginal rate of substitution between a







and can be used to price any nominal asset. The price of a one-period nominal bond is given
by q1
t = Etmt+1 and that of an n-period nominal bond by qn
t = Etmt+1mt+2:::mt+n: Given
our approximation to the log of a trader’s marginal utility (28), we obtain
¡logmt+1 = ± + (Á + 1)
³
log¹t+1 ¡ log ¹ ¹
´
¡ Á(log¹t ¡ log ¹ ¹); (39)
23where ± = ¡log¯ + log ¹ ¹ and Á is given in (29). Equations (37) and (39) then imply that
the pricing kernel is log-normal with an in…nite moving-average representation
¡logmt+1 = ± +
1 X
j=0
®j"t+1¡j , with (40)
®0 = (Á + 1)µ0; and for j ¸ 0; ®j+1 = Á(µj+1 ¡ µj) + µj+1: (41)
Notice that ®0 = ¡@ log[U0(cTt)=Pt]=@"t is the impact of a money shock on the
marginal utility of adollarin periodt while ®j+1 = ¡Et@ log[U0(cTt+j+1)Pt=U0(cTt+j)Pt+j+1]=@"t
is the impact of a money shock on the expected nominal interest rate between periods t + j
and t + j + 1. This e¤ect can be decomposed into two pieces: µj+1 = Et@ log¹t+j+1=@"t
is the e¤ect of the shock on expected in‡ation from period t + j to period t + j + 1; while
Á(µj+1¡µj) = ¡Et@ log[U0(cTt+j+1)=U0(cTt+j)]=@"t is the e¤ect of the shock on the expected
one-period real interest rate from period t+j to period t+j+1: Clearly, Á(µj+1¡µj) re‡ects
the market segmentation e¤ect on this one-period real interest rate.

















(An+j ¡ Aj)"t¡j; (43)
where Aj =
Pj
i=0®i and ¹ fn and ¹ rn are mean rates that we discuss later. Notice that with
n = 1; (43) reduces to r1
t = ¹ r1 +
P1
j=1®j"t+1¡j:
Example 2. (Long memory processes). Now consider a fractionally integrated process for
money growth and in‡ation. We are motivated by the …ndings (surveyed in Baillie 1996) that
24a single-factor long-memory model can mimic the slow decay of the observed autocorrelations
of in‡ation. With such a process, we …nd that a persistent increase in the money growth
rate leads …rst to a decline in nominal interest rates and then eventually to an increase in
these rates. As a result, this increase in the money growth rate twists the forward rate curve,
lowering short-term forward rates and raising long-term ones. At least since Friedman (1968),
economists have argued that money injections have these e¤ects on interest rates.
Let money growth and in‡ation follow a fractionally integrated process of the form
(1 ¡ L)d¹t = "t; where ¡1=2 < d < 1=2: The …rst-order autocorrelation of this process is
d=(1 ¡ d): The coe¢cients of the moving-average representation of the money growth and








for j ¸ 1. The parameter d controls the rate of decay of the moving-average coe¢cients.
These coe¢cients decay at a rate (1 ¡d)=j < 1: For large j; this rate approaches 0; which is
the source of the long memory.
A long-memory shock to money growth leads initially to lower short-term nominal
interest rates and then to higher ones, and it twists the forward rate curve as follows. From
(43) and (42), we know that the impact of a money growth shock at t on the expected one-
period interest rate in period t+ j and on the forward rate of maturity j in period t is given











where the …rst term is the segmentation e¤ect and the second is the expected in‡ation e¤ect.
Since the coe¢cients µj are all positive, for large enough j the expected in‡ation e¤ect must
25dominate the segmentation e¤ect and ®j must be positive. If Á > d=(1¡d); then for j = 1; the
segmentation e¤ect outweighs the expected in‡ation e¤ect, and so for small j; ®j is negative.
If we ignore integers, we see that ®j goes from negative to positive at j¤ = (1+Á)(1¡d): Notice
that the more segmented is the market, the longer is the period in which the segmentation
e¤ect outweighs the expected in‡ation e¤ect.
5. The Average Term Structure of Interest Rates
Finally, we consider the implications of monetary policy for the average yields of
bonds of di¤erent maturities in the segmented markets model. Two measures of the term
structure of interest rates are the forward rate curve and the yield curve. In the data, both
of these are upward-sloping, at least for maturities of up to seven years. (See for example,
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997.) In the standard model, persistent money growth shocks
produce downward-sloping forward rate and yield curves on average. In contrast, if markets
are su¢ciently segmented, then these shocks produce upward-sloping forward rate and yield
curves on average.
From (31), we have that the average nominal bond price is
log ¹ q













Thus, the average forward rate and yield curves are given, respectively, by
¹ f






































26In Appendix B, we show that these simplify to
¹ f





















i=0®i and the coe¢cients ®i are the moving-average coe¢cients of the pricing
kernel (40).
The model we have considered has only one type of money shock. In such a one-factor
model, liquidity e¤ects and the average slope of the forward rate curve are closely connected,
as the following propositions show.
Proposition 6. If money growth shocks are persistent, so that µj ¸ 0 for all j = 0;:::;J;
then the forward rate curve is upward-sloping up to maturity J if and only if there are J-period
liquidity e¤ects in the sense that ®j ￿ 0 for j = 1;:::;J:
Proof. Since Aj =
Pj
i=0®i; from (40) we have that Aj = Áµj +
Pj
i=0µi: Thus, if µj ¸ 0 for
j = 0;:::;J; then Aj ¸ 0 for j = 0;:::;J. Clearly, if ®j ￿ 0 for j = 1;:::;J; then Aj is
decreasing in j for j = 0;:::;J; so that A2
0 ¸ A2
1 ¸ A2
2 ¸ ::: ¸ A2
J; and, from (48); the
forward rate curve is upward-sloping. Conversely, if the forward rate curve is upward-sloping
for j = 1;:::;J, then A2
0 ¸ A2
1 ¸ A2
2 ¸ ::: ¸ A2
J. Since Aj ¸ 0; ®j ￿ 0 for j = 1;:::;J.
Proposition 7. If money injections have J-period liquidity e¤ects in the sense that ®j ￿ 0
for j = 0;:::;J and money growth shocks are persistent and decay monotonically in the sense
that µj ¸ 0 and µj ￿ µj¡1 for j = 0;:::;J; then the more segmented are markets, the steeper
is the forward rate curve.





j) = (Aj¡1 ¡ Aj)(Aj¡1 + Aj); which equals
¡[Á(µj ¡ µj¡1) + µj]
2






Given the conditions on µj; this expression is increasing in the segmentation parameter Á:
To get some intuition for these results, observe from (47) that the average yield curve












grows more slowly than n: Clearly, (50) is the variance of the long di¤erence of the marginal
utility of a dollar. Notice that if the marginal utility of a dollar follows a random walk, then
this variance grows linearly with n; and thus the average yield curve is ‡at. If the marginal
utility of a dollar has a large temporary component, then this variance will grow more slowly
than n and the yield curve is upward-sloping. In our model, shocks to money growth have a
permanent e¤ect on the price level, but only a temporary e¤ect on the consumption of traders.
For the yield curve to be upward-sloping, the temporary e¤ect, due to market segmentation,
must be large. (See Campbell and Mankiw 1987 and Cochrane 1988 for some discussion of
the statistical properties of long di¤erences.)
Consider again our two examples.
(Autoregressive money growth). With AR1 money growth rates, recall that µj = ½jµ0; so
that all the coe¢cients µj are positive and declining for all j; and hence the hypotheses of
Propositions 6 and 7 are satis…ed. In the standard model; all the coe¢cients ®j are positive,
28so that the forward rate and yield curves are downward-sloping. In the segmented markets
model, however, if Á is large enough to satisfy (34), then the forward rate and yield curves
are upward-sloping at all maturities.
(Long-memory money growth.) The moving-average coe¢cients of the long-memory money
growth process satisfy (44), so that µj ¸ 0 and µj < µj¡1 for all j; and hence, Propositions
6 and 7 apply. Recall that ®j ￿ 0 for j = 1; :::;j¤; where j¤ = (1 + Á)(1 ¡ d): Thus, the
forward rate curve and the yield curve are upward-sloping for j = 1; :::;j¤: Notice that the
more segmented is the market, the longer are the maturities for which the forward rate and
yield curves are upward-sloping.
Propositions 6 and 7 do not directly apply to a model in which there are several types
of money shocks. Consider, for example, a process for money growth with two types of
shocks. Obviously, Propositions 6 and 7 do not apply directly here. However, the slopes
of the forward and yield curves for the two-factor model are the sum of the slopes of yield
curves corresponding to the two factors separately. In this sense, the propositions apply to
each factor separately. (See Zin 1998 for a discussion of two factor models.)
6. Conclusion
We have developed a tractable model that captures the idea that when a government
injects money through an open market operation, only a fraction of the agents in the economy
are on the other side of the transaction. We show that in such a model, money shocks can
generate both persistent liquidity e¤ects and twists in the forward rate curve. The model can
also produce-an upward sloping yield curve on average.
29Appendix A
Here we present two additional examples illustrating the e¤ect of money growth shocks
on a trader’s consumption.
First, let all agents have identical constant endowment y: In equilibrium, a fraction ®
of agents are traders and purchase the money injection from the government, and (1¡®) are
nontraders. Since agents must be indi¤erent between trading and not trading, the following
condition must hold:
U(cT) ¡ U
0(cT)(cT + ° ¡ y=¹) = U(y=¹): (51)
This equation has two solutions for cT : one with cT + ° > y=¹ and one with cT + ° <
y=¹. When the money injection is positive, traders must purchase real balances from the
government, so the equilibrium solution satis…es cT + ° > y=¹: The fraction ® adjusts to





U00(cT)[cT + ° ¡ (y=¹)]
< 0: (52)
Again, an increase in the money growth rate ¹ redistributes in‡ation tax revenues from
nontraders to traders. Here, however, the number of traders increases so much that the
amount of consumption per trader actually falls.
Next, consider the case in which y has a continuous density. Di¤erentiating (19)–(20)
gives
(
[F(yL) + 1 ¡ F(yH)] + ¹f(yL)
Ã











































U00(cT)(cT + ° ¡ yi=¹)
U0(cT) ¡ U0(yi=¹)
:
From (19) it follows that yL=¹ < cT < yH=¹ ¡ °: Thus, ´H and ´L are positive and so is
the term in braces on the left side of (53). On the right side of (53), the …rst two terms are
negative and the last is positive, so without further restrictions, the sign of the right side of
(53) is ambiguous. In our example in the text in which there are three income levels, the










[F(yL) + 1 ¡ F(yH)]
> 0:
In our example above in which all agents have the same income, the densities are f(yL) = 1
and f(yH) = 0 so that, in the limit (53) reduces to (52).
Consider now a third example, in which y is uniform on [0;1] and the utility function is













In this case, the side of (53) simpli…es to °(yH ¡yL)=2¹; which is positive. Thus, under these
restrictions dcT=dlog¹ is positive.
31Appendix B
Here we solve for the average forward rate and yield curves as a function of the pa-























































Average forward rates and yields are given by
¹ f















Using (40) and letting An = (®0 + ®1 + ::: + ®n); we see that average forward rates and
yields are given by (48) and (49).
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